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The usage of mobile banking and in particular, 
payments by means of mobile phones, has increased in 
recent years in South Africa, with consequent impacts from 
a legal and regulatory point of view. South Africa is a 
developing economy with a large “unbanked” sector. That 
is, a large segment of the population does not have bank 
accounts and “banking” happens through informal means. 
This Article deals with the legal and regulatory framework 
pertaining to mobile money and examines issues relating to 
financial integrity and financial inclusion as they present 
themselves in South Africa. The author states that the 
regulatory framework in South Africa is not entirely 
conducive to greater financial inclusion and argues for a 
better balance between the regulation of risk and access to 
the payment system through an enhanced implementation 
of a risk-based approach. 
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Mobile banking, and consequently, mobile payments and 
mobile money are the latest in a myriad of emerging technological 
innovations in the banking industry. The usage of mobile banking 
and in particular, payments by means of mobile phones, have 
increased in recent years in South Africa, with consequent impacts 
from a legal and regulatory point of view. 
South Africa is a developing economy with a large “unbanked” 
sector. That is, a large segment of the population does not have 
bank accounts and “banking” happens through informal means. It 
also appears from latest figures that the penetration level of South 
Africans with mobile phones is increasing, yet the regulatory 
framework is not entirely conducive to greater financial inclusion. 
This Article seeks to examine the legal and regulatory framework 
pertaining to mobile money and examines issues relating to 
financial integrity and financial inclusion as they present 
themselves in South Africa. Regulatory gaps and areas for 
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improvement are highlighted. The author argues for a more 
flexible approach to regulation in South Africa to enhance 
financial inclusion through the use of mobile money there. 
 
I. DEFINITION OF MOBILE MONEY 
 
Before one could understand the term “mobile money,” it is 
necessary to understand associated terms that may have bearing on 
the definition of mobile money. As a form of e-banking,1 “m-
banking” is defined as “financial services delivered via mobile 
networks and performed on a mobile phone. These services may or 
may not be defined as banking services by the regulator, depending 
on the legislation of the country in question, as well as on which 
services are offered.”2 
“Mobile money” or “m-money” is a form of electronic money 
and refers to services that connect consumers financially through 
mobile phones. Mobile money allows for any mobile phone 
subscriber—whether banked or unbanked—to deposit value into 
their mobile account, send value via a simple handset to another 
mobile subscriber, and allow the recipient to turn that value back 
into cash easily and cheaply.3 In this way, m-money can be used 
for both mobile money transfers4 and mobile payments.5 Mobile 
1 E-banking is the use of electronic delivery channels for banking products 
and services. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], RISK MANAGEMENT 
PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRONIC BANK 5 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs82.pdf. 
2 Lennart Bångens & Björn Söderberg, Mobile Banking – Financial 
Services for the Unbanked? 14 (Swedish Program for ICT in Dev. Regions, 
2008), available at http://www.spidercenter.org/sites/default/files/Mobile% 
20banking%20-%20financial%20services%20for%20the%20unbanked.pdf. For 
the most recent publication, see PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING 
MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY CHANGES AND 
SOLUTIONS (2011).  
3 COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. [CPSS], BIS, SURVEY OF 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRONIC MONEY AND INTERNET AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 
4 (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss62.pdf.  
4 “Mobile money transfers” are international remittances using mobile 
phones. For more detail, see CPSS & THE WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
FOR INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE SERVICES 2 (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAYMENTREMMITTANCE/Resources
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money transfers are thus included in the definition of mobile 
money for the purposes of this Article. 
 
II. MOBILE MONEY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Mobile banking has been increasing in South Africa. Several 
initiatives have emerged for initiating payments from mobile 
phones by using short messaging services (SMS) or phone calls. 
Some products use the phone as an access channel through existing 
bank accounts or payment cards. Meanwhile, other products allow 
customers to pay using prepaid value stored on their mobile phone 
or to pay afterwards, where payment for goods or services are 
additional items on the customer’s phone bill or through the use of 
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology. However, this 
system was only piloted once within a closed system during a 
music festival called “Oppikoppi” and on a trial basis by ABSA 
employees.6 
Initially the four major banks in South Africa were given a 
wake-up call with the emergence of then-new kid on the block, 
WIZZIT.7 However, it is apparent that it is now the four biggest 
/New_Remittance_Report.pdf. See also Simbarashe Mbalekwa, The Legal and 
Regulatory Aspects of International Remittances Within the SADC Region (Jan. 
2011) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, Nelson Mandela Metro. Univ.), 
available at http://www.nmmu.ac.za/documents/theses/SIMBARASHE% 
20MBALEKWA.pdf. 
5 “Mobile payments” refer to the provision of payment services through the 
use of mobile phones, mostly electronic funds transfer between a customer’s 
own accounts, transfers to a third party (beneficiary), or would be mobile 
money. A mobile payment may also refer to the process of two parties 
exchanging financial value using a mobile device in return for goods and 
services. See Elham Ramezani, Mobile Payment 4 (June 17, 2008) (term paper, 
Hochschule Furtwangen Univ.), available at http://webuser.hs-furtwangen.de/ 
~heindl/ebte-08-ss-mobile-payment-Ramezani.pdf. 
6 Jan Vermeulen, Oppikoppi to go Cash Free in 2011, MYBROADBAND 
(July 2, 2011), http://mybroadband.co.za/news/general/28051-oppikoppi-to-go-
cash-free-in-2011.html; Media Release, ABSA Bank, Cellphones as Payment 
Devices (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.absa.co.za/Absacoza/Media-
Centre/Press-Statements/Cellphones-as-payment-devices.  
7 WIZZIT is the brain-child of Brian Richardson. It has a strategy of 
getting into South African townships using “whizz kids” to sign up users to open 
bank accounts. MTN Banking is a joint venture between MTN and Standard 
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commercial banks (Nedbank, First National Bank, Standard Bank, 
and ABSA) that are the providers of mobile banking services in 
South Africa through joint ventures with mobile technology 
companies and retailers. For example, Nedbank and mobile 
operator Vodacom teamed up to launch M-PESA, a solution that 
enables person-to-person money transfers via mobile phone, even 
between persons without bank accounts. This followed the 
Standard Bank’s launch of a similar product, called “Instant 
Money,” a joint venture between the bank and local retailer Spar. 
Standard Bank also has a joint venture company called “Oltio” 
between itself and pan-African mobile network operator MTN, 
which, through its “payD” platform enables customers to purchase 
products and services online and use their debit cards to pay for the 
purchase while making use of their mobile phones to enter their 
personal identification numbers (PINs). First National Bank also 
entered the fray, launching its “e-Wallet” mobile money transfer 
solution, which allows customers to send money to anyone in 
South Africa with a valid mobile phone number. Finally, as stated 
previously, ABSA Bank conducted South Africa’s first live user 
trial of NFC technology on mobile phones, in a partnership with 
MasterCard, to embed the “Paypass Tap and Go” payment chip on 
mobile handsets for the trial. This enabled customers to load funds 
onto their phones through the ABSA website or ATMs and then to 
pay for goods or services by merely holding their phones in front 
of NFC-enabled pay points. The value of their transactions is then 
immediately debited from their stored value.8 
Bank of South Africa. MTN simply requires a SMS that the user provides an ID 
number and make a follow-up call to start an account-opening procedure that 
includes voice recognition technology. FNB Mobile at one stage in 2005 signed 
up 130,000 customers in six months. WIZZIT was developed to operate even in 
older phones and is not confined to any mobile telecommunications network. It 
“piggybacks” on the banking license of Bank of Athens, a registered branch of a 
foreign banking institution. See Maya Fisher-French, Talking ‘Bout a 
Revolution, MAVERICK MAGAZINE, Nov. 3, 2005, at 34, available at 
http://www.wizzit.co.za/media/revolution.pdf.  
8 For more detail, see the websites of the four commercial banks: FIRST 
NAT’L BANK, http://www.fnb.co.za; STANDARD BANK, 
http://www.standardbank.co.za; ABSA BANK, http://www.absa.co.za; and 
NEDBANK, www.nedbank.co.za (all websites last visited Aug. 16, 2012).  
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Mobile devices are well positioned for making payments 
because the penetration level of digital mobile phones is higher in 
South Africa than that of computers. Latest figures from Wide 
World Worx suggest that in 2009 South Africa had a mobile 
penetration level of about 10.8 percent, which amounted to 
5,300,000 users out of a population of 49,052,489.9 
It is interesting that, even though the use of Internet services 
has exploded in South Africa, less than half of urban mobile phone 
users who have Internet-enabled phones use the Internet. As many 
as 9,500,000 South Africans are able to browse the Internet on 
their phones.10 If they use the Internet, the figure of World Wide 
Worx would almost double to 9,600,000.11 The potential thus 
clearly exists for a higher penetration level with respect to Internet-
enabled payments through the use of a mobile phone. 
It is also interesting to note the inroads that have been made to 
increase the level of banked South Africans. Between 1993 and 
2009, the number of banked South Africans increased remarkably, 
especially in the black ethnic group. This increase has largely been 
due to easier access to banking services being provided to people 
living in informal urban areas and to those earning less than 
ZAR2,000 a month. The driving force behind the substantial 
increase was the South African government policy on economic 
empowerment and the inclusion of targets in the Financial Sector 
Charter, which led to a proliferation of products and services 
offered, such as “Mzanzi accounts,” ATM cards, debit/check cards, 
credit cards, savings and transaction accounts, as well as mobile 
banking.12 Nonetheless, a significant portion of the black 
population is still unbanked.13 
9 South Africa Internet Usage, Population, Broadband and Market Report, 
INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.co./af/za.htm (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2012).  
10 Ian Mansfield, Mobile Internet Usage Booms in South Africa, CELLULAR 
NEWS (May 27, 2010), http://www.cellular-news.com/story/43524.php. 
11 Id. 
12 For more detail, see GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION [GPFI], GLOBAL 
STANDARD SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available at 
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/Global%20Standard%20Settin
g%20Bodies%20and%20FI.pdf. 
13 For more detail, see FINMARK TRUST, FINSCOPE SOUTH AFRICA (2009), 
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III. FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL  
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE MONEY 
 
The regulatory stance in South Africa has mostly been with 
reference to electronic money, a subset of e-banking. The legal and 
regulatory framework with regards to e-banking would apply to 
mobile banking. In South Africa the legal framework is comprised 
of the following: 
 South African Reserve Bank Act (Act 89 of 1990); 
 National Payment System Act (Act 78 of 1998); 
 Banks Act (Act 90 of 1994); 
 Exchange Control Regulations (if cross-border); 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001); and 
 South African Reserve Bank Position Paper on Electronic 
Money.14 
 
A.  The National Payment System (NPS) 
 
Payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of 
financial systems in a country and globally.15 If a payment system 
is insufficiently protected against risks such as credit, liquidity, and 
available at http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2009/Brochure_SA09.pdf. 
See also Press Release, FinMark Trust & TNS Research Surveys, South Africa 
in Black and White (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.tnsresearchsurveys.co.za/news-centre/pdf/2009/Fin08-
FaceofSA.pdf. 
14 S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, POSITION PAPER ON ELECTRONIC MONEY (2009), 
available at http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/ 
NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Legal/Documents/Position%20Paper/PP2009_01
.pdf [hereinafter POSITION PAPER].  
15 The payment system can also be described as the “essential oil that 
lubricates the economy.” Stefan Gannon, Weaving Nets to Catch the Wind: The 
Legal and Regulatory Issues Concerning the Development of Robust and 
Efficient International Electronic Financial Infrastructure, 33 COMM. L. WORLD 
REV. 352, 353 (2004).  
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settlement risks, disruption within the system could trigger or 
transmit further disruptions among its participants, or generate 
systemic disruptions in the financial markets or more widely across 
the economy. This phenomenon is referred to as “systemic risk.”16 
A fundamental requirement for a stable and secure payment 
system is that it should operate in a well-defined legal 
environment, setting out the rights and obligations of each party 
involved in effecting a payment through the system.17 It is for this 
very reason that Core Principle I of the Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems published by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the BIS 
provides that the legal basis for payments should be well defined.18 
The ambit of the South African NPS has been confirmed by the 
Reserve Bank in its recently released National Payment System 
Framework and Strategy Vision 2015.19 
16 The generally accepted terminology used to describe these risks are 
derived from CPSS, BIS, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN PAYMENTS AND 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
cpss00b.pdf.  
17 This is to guard against “legal risk.” “Legal risk” is defined by the BIS as 
“the risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or regulation or 
because a contract cannot be enforced.” See id. at 29.  
18 It states that “the system should have a well founded legal basis under all 
relevant jurisdictions.” CPSS, BIS, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 6 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/cpss43.pdf.  
19 S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND 
STRATEGY: VISION 2015 9 (2011), available at http://www.resbank.co.za/ 
RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Documents/Overvie
w/Vision2015.pdf. The ambit of the NPS or “payment system” is described in 
the S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND 
STRATEGY: VISION 2010 11 (2006), available at http://www.resbank.co.za/ 
RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Documents/Overvie
w/Vision2010.pdf: 
The oversight domain of the NPS entails the entire process of 
making payment. In other words, it entails the process 
(including but not limited to) that enables the payer to make a 
payment . . . the payer to issue a payment instruction via a 
payment instrument or other infrastructure, the institution to 
receive the payment instruction via clearing or otherwise, the 
process of clearing and settlement (where applicable), the 
beneficiary to accept the payment instruction, the beneficiary 
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B.  Oversight of the NPS 
 
The Reserve Bank, as a neutral agent, is best suited to oversee 
and supervise the NPS. Section 10(1)(c) of the South African 
Reserve Bank Act enables the Reserve Bank to establish, operate, 
oversee, and regulate payment, clearing, and settlement systems. 
This power is reaffirmed in Section 2 of the National Payment 
System Act.20 
Besides the general powers of oversight in terms of Section 
10(1)(c) of the Reserve Bank Act as mentioned above, the Reserve 
Bank has the power to issue directives,21 in consultation with the 
to deliver the payment instruction to an institution for 
collection, the institution to receive and deliver the payment 
collection into clearing and settlement, and the beneficiary to 
receive the benefit of the payment. Within the described 
process, banks, third-person payment providers, system 
operators, PCH system operators [PCH refers to a “payment 
clearing house”] and agents of payers and/or beneficiaries are 
included.  
20 Nat’l Payment Sys. Act 78 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/NPS%20Act.pdf [hereinafter NPS Act]. The National 
Payment System Department of the Reserve Bank performs the oversight of 
payments in South Africa. In terms of Section 3 of the Banks Act, the Registrar 
of Banks supervises the banking industry. The Registrar performs this function, 
in conjunction with the Bank Supervision Department of the Reserve Bank. 
Depending on the type of banking product that a bank wishes to offer, oversight 
would fall into the domain of either of these departments, sometimes into both. 
For example, there is no provision in the Banks Act that prevents a bank from 
setting up mobile banking. However, if mobile payments are offered, the matter 
would fall within the ambit of the National Payment System Department 
(NPSD), because the provision of these services may pose systemic or other 
risks which may threaten the stability of and confidence in, the National 
Payment System. For more detail on the South African NPS, see Vivienne 
Lawack-Davids, The Legal and Regulatory Framework of the National Payment 
System (NPS) – Peeling the Layers of the Onion, 29 OBITER 453 (2008).  
21 Directives issued in consultation with the payment system management 
body terms of Subsection 1 are “general directives,” as opposed to the “remedial 
directives” which the Reserve Bank may issue in terms of Subsection 3. 
Provision is made for the cancellation of previously issued directives and an 
offense in Subsection 3. See NPS Act §§ 12(3), (5), (6), (8).  
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payment system management body and other stakeholders (Section 
12(1)).22 The Reserve Bank has to date issued three directives, to 
wit, in respect of banks involved in the collection of payment 
instructions in the early debit order of Payment Clearing Houses 
(PCHs),23 in respect of system operators,24 and in respect of 
payments to third persons,25 but no directives dealing with m-
money or m-payments. 
Furthermore, the Reserve Bank sometimes issues Position 
Papers to clarify its regulatory stance. Although Position Papers do 
not have the same legal binding power as directives, they are 
usually followed because of the Reserve Bank’s moral persuasion 
powers. In addition, if the Reserve Bank is so inclined, it may issue 
a special directive aligned with its stance in the Position Paper that 
must be complied with, otherwise the Reserve Bank may apply to 
the High Court for an order to direct such person to comply with 
the directive issued. 
“Mobile money” is defined in the 2009 Position Paper as: 
[M]onetary value represented by a claim on the 
issuer. This money is stored electronically and 
issued on receipt of funds, is generally accepted as a 
means of payment by persons other than the issuer 
and is redeemable for physical cash or a deposit into 
a bank account on demand.26 
22 It is an offense to fail, refuse, or neglect to comply with directives and a 
person who is found guilty of such an offense is liable to a fine of ZAR1 million 
or to imprisonment or to both a fine and imprisonment. No directives issued will 
have retroactive effect. Provision is also made for a grace period in respect of 
“general directives,” as opposed to “remedial directives” which will become 
effective immediately. See id. at § 12(9).  
23 See NPS Act Directive 2 of 2006 (S. Afr).  
24 See NPS Act Directive 2 of 2007 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/Directives/D2_2007(SysOp).pdf. 
25 See NPS Act Directive 1 of 2007 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/Directives/D1_2007(ThirdParty).pdf.  
26 POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 3. The Reserve Bank initially issued a 
Position Paper on mobile money in 1999. This Position Paper was amended in 
2006 and subsequently again in 2009.  
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Having “money” stored on a mobile phone could satisfy the 
definition of “mobile money” since it is monetary value 
represented by a claim on the issuer, it is stored electronically (on 
the mobile phone), it is issued on receipt of funds (to the issuer), 
and may be redeemed for physical cash or deposited into a bank 
account. However, one could argue that at this stage, mobile 
payments, while growing, would not be “generally accepted as a 
means of payment by persons other than the issuer.” 
The definition of e-money in the 2009 Position Paper is 
different from previous definitions of mobile money in various 
respects. Most notably for purposes of this Article is that the 
Position Paper now states that only South African registered banks 
may issue mobile money, unlike the reference in the previous 
definitions of “making payments to undertakings other than the 
issuer, with or without involving bank accounts in the transaction.” 
With the emergence of a few non-banks, such as mobile 
banking services providers and retailers, the effect is that the 
normal sponsorship arrangements for clearing and settlement will 
prevail. In other words, the retailer or technology company is not a 
settlement system participant and needs to be sponsored by a bank 
to enable clearing and settlement.27 
Viewed from the Reserve Bank’s point of view, it could be 
argued that emerging e-money products may require regulatory 
adjustment or intervention, which may arise from the need to: 
 Maintain the integrity, confidence and limit the risk in the 
NPS; 
 Assist other regulatory authorities in providing consumers 
with adequate protection from unfair practices, fraud and 
financial loss; and 
 Assist law enforcement agencies in the prevention of 
criminal activity.28 
This view is affirmed by the new Reserve Bank Payment 
System Vision 2015, which explains that, in view of the global 
27 See NPS Act §§ 4(2)(d)(i), 6 on clearing and sponsorship arrangements. 
See also POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 4.  
28 POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 4.  
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crisis, a tightening of oversight is needed. Viewed from the 
perspective of non-banks wanting to enter this market, the Position 
Paper limits financial inclusion (access to the payment system) in 
that the non-bank would have to enter into a sponsoring 
arrangement with a bank, with consequent cost implications for 
such non-bank. Furthermore, the high growth and penetration rates 
of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into banks in 
pockets of Africa is providing opportunities for countries on the 
African continent to increase affordable and cost-effective means 
of bringing the “unbanked” into the formal financial system.29 
With the requirement in the Position Paper that an issuer of e-
money has to be a bank registered in South Africa, multiple 
regulators are involved, namely the South African Reserve Bank 
for regulation of banking and oversight of payments and the 
telecommunications regulator for the regulation of the 
telecommunications service provider.30 The problem with multiple 
regulators is that the possibility exists for regulatory arbitrage, that 
is, that players would take advantage of regulatory lacunae. 
Whilst the above legal and regulatory environment seems for 
the most part sound, there are uncertainties as highlighted. It is 
submitted that instead of focusing on e-money, the South African 
Reserve Bank may want to consider issuing a Position Paper 
dealing with all forms of emerging payment technologies in which 
definitions can be stated clearly and any change in regulatory 
stance explained with reference to other regulatory instruments. It 
seems that due to the tightening of regulation, the trade-off is in 
favor of risk management over financial inclusion (access to the 
payment system). Klein and Mayer make a compelling argument 
that what mobile banking illustrates in a stark form is the way in 
29 See for example the success of M-PESA in Kenya. For more information, 
see Carmen Nobel, Mobile Banking for the Unbanked, HARVARD BUS. SCH. 
(June 13, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6729.html.  
30 The Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (S. Afr.) replaced the 
former Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996 (S. Afr.). This Act aims to 
converge broadcasting and telecommunications under one regulator. In South 
Africa, telecommunications are regulated in terms of the Electronic 
Communications Act. The main authority is the Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa, established by Section 3 of the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 (S. Afr.). 
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which payment systems can be disaggregated into component 
services, namely exchange, storage, transfer and investment. In 
their words: “Regulation should mirror this and be structured by 
service rather than along traditional institutional lines, like a bank. 
The question then is what type of regulation is appropriate for each 
type of service.”31 
Okeahalam examines the NPS from an economic point of view 
and argues that there may be a trade-off between widening of 
access in the payment system and systemic risk. Whilst it is 
difficult to be specific as to the exact cost of widening access, there 
are financial, microeconomic, and actuarial methods for estimation 
of risk and relating risk to the welfare benefits of the payment 
system.32 It is submitted that Okeahalam is correct in his argument 
that different payment instruments present different sets of risk to 
the payment system. It is submitted that a “stratified” regulatory 
approach could be followed once an analysis has been done of the 
risk presented by individual instruments, as opposed to the 
individual institution, as is presently the case. This would mean 
that the regulatory approach would then be stratified based on the 
risks presented by the specific payment instrument. This is a 
challenge which is presently not well researched in South Africa, 
since the risks are determined based on the profile of the bank or 
institution. It is further submitted that with the increasing 
penetration level of mobile users in South Africa, research is 
needed into the impact on access to the unbanked given the change 
in regulatory stance of the South African Reserve Bank, lest a 
golden opportunity is missed to broaden access to financial 
services to the poor in South Africa. 
 
 
31 See Michael Klein & Colin Mayer, Mobile Banking and Financial 
Inclusion: The Regulatory Lessons 25 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 
5664, 2011), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/05/18/000158349_20110518143113/Rende
red/PDF/WPS5664.pdf. 
32 Charles C. Okeahalam, Regulation of the Payments System of South 
Africa, 4 J. INT’L BANKING REG. 338, 347-48 (2003).  
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IV. FINANCIAL INTEGRITY 
 
This section deals with anti-money laundering (AML) and 
combatting financing of terrorist (CFT) concerns as regulated in 
South Africa. Other policy issues such as seigniorage, operation of 
monetary policy, and consumer protection concerns fall outside of 
the ambit of this Article. 
 
A.  South Africa 
 
South Africa has criminalized money laundering in three 
separate provisions of the 1998 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
(POCA),33 which cover the conversion or transfer, concealment or 
disguise, possession, and acquisition of property in a manner that is 
largely consistent with the 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Vienna Convention) and the 2000 U.N. Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention). 
POCA provides for both criminal and civil forfeiture. The former 
is based on conviction of the offender whereas the latter is not 
dependent on conviction.34 
Terrorist financing is criminalized in South Africa in Section 4 
of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA).35 The POCDATARA 
is comprehensive and criminalizes the collection or provision of 
property with the intention that it be used for the purpose of 
committing a terrorist act, or by a terrorist organization or 
individual terrorist for any purpose. 
Comprehensive AML/CFT preventative measures have been 
33 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.dac.gov.za/acts/Prevention%20of%20Organised%20Crime%20Act.
pdf. 
34 For a comprehensive overview of the applicable legislation, see Louis de 
Koker, Money Laundering in South Africa, in PROFILING MONEY LAUNDERING 
IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 83 (Charles Goredema ed., 2003), available 
at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono90.pdf. 
35 Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act 33 of 2004 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/ 
view/DownloadFileAction?id=67972. 
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implemented in South Africa through the application of the 2001 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)36 and the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations (MLTFC 
Regulations), read with  various exemptions in terms of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Exemptions). The FICA has 
since been amended in 2008 by the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Amendment Act, which addressed, inter alia, some of the 
supervisory concerns raised in the FATF mutual evaluation of 
South Africa undertaken in 2008.37 While the POCA is the primary 
piece of legislation in terms of outlining activities that constitute 
money laundering offences, it does not outline the measures to be 
implemented to suppress and detect money laundering. Such is 
provided for in the FICA38 which is the principle piece of 
legislation in terms of outlining AML measures. 
What follows is a more detailed exposition of the specific 
issues pertinent to this Article. 
 
B.   Analysis 
 
South African AML and CFT laws primarily affect mobile 
money via the customer due diligence (CDD) requirements that 
they place upon financial institutions. The CDD measures of the 
FICA and the POCDATARA are set out in the FICA, read with the 
MLTFC Regulations. The nature of these CDD requisites and their 
impact upon mobile money transactions are examined below. 
 
1. Customer Identification and Verification 
 
Section 21 of the FICA places an obligation upon “accountable 
institutions” to establish as well as verify the identity of their 
clients. The First Schedule of the Act outlines which institutions 
36 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68138 [hereinafter 
FICA].  
37 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: 
SOUTH AFRICA (2009), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/ 
documents/reports/mer/MER%20South%20Africa%20full.pdf.  
38 FICA, supra note 36. 
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are accountable institutions in terms of the Act and amongst those 
listed are banks as well as money remitters. The FICA prohibits 
these institutions from establishing a business relationship or 
concluding a single transaction with a person unless they have 
taken steps to: 
 Establish as well and verify the identity of the client; and 
 If the client is acting on behalf of another person, or 
alternatively, if the person acts on behalf of the client, the 
institution must establish and verify the identity of the other 
person and their authority to act on behalf of the client, or 
as the case may be, the client’s authority to act on behalf of 
another person. 
Should an accountable institution open an account or conclude 
a single transaction (once-off) transaction without duly identifying 
the client it commits an offence in terms of FICA.39 The penalty 
for such an offence is imprisonment for a maximum period of 15 
years or a fine of ZAR100 million (US$12 million).40 
The MLTFC Regulations, which have to be read in conjunction 
with the FICA, give more intrinsic details in regard to how 
customer identification and verification of such is to be carried out 
(promulgated by GN No. R1595 in GG No. 24176). The 
Regulations state that, when establishing and verifying the identity 
of a client, the following information must be obtained: 
 In the case of citizens, their full name, date of birth, 
identification number, residential address, and tax 
registration number.41 
 In the case of foreigners, in addition to the ordinary 
information that a citizen must provide, they are required to 
give details in regard to their nationality as well as passport 
number.42 
39 Id. at § 46.  
40 Id. at § 68.  
41 Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regulations, Reg. 3, in 
Government Notice (GN) R1595/2002 4 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter MLTFC 
Regulations].  
42 Id. at 5 (Reg. 5).  
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The FICA, in contrast to the Exchange Control Act and its 
Regulations, does not put a duty on financial institutions to 
determine whether their clients are legally present in South Africa. 
Hence non-citizens are not required to provide details in regard to 
their residence or work permit in order for financial institutions to 
comply with the FICA provisions.43 
A person’s identity has to be verified by means of an 
identification document.44 In the case of South African citizens and 
residents, an official national identity document would need to be 
presented whereas foreigners have to present a passport.45 
Residential addresses are to be verified using documents such as a 
utility bill.46 Records in regard to, amongst other information, a 
client’s identity, as well as transaction amounts, must be kept for a 
period of five years from the date that the business relationship is 
established or transaction is concluded.47 
The regulator was mindful of the fact that the need to present 
an identity document could prevent individuals without such a 
document from accessing formal financial services and hence 
created room for exclusion. The MLTFC Regulations therefore 
allow financial institutions, in circumstances were it is deemed to 
be reasonably acceptable for a person to be unable to provide an 
identity document, to rely on another document issued to that 
person that bears the following: 
 A photograph of the person; 
 The person’s full name or initials and surname; 
 The person’s date of birth; and 
43 Hennie Bester et al., Reviewing the Policy Framework for Money 
Transfers 18 (FinMark Trust & CENFRI, 2010), available at http://cenfri.org/ 
documents/Remittances/2010/Regulatory%20framework%20for%20money%20
transfers_South%20Africa_discussion%20doc_250110.pdf.  
44 MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 4-5 (Reg. 4), 6 (Reg. 6).  
45 An identity document is defined in Regulation 1. Id. at 3.  
46 Hennie Bester et al., Implementing FATF Standards in Developing 
Countries and Financial Inclusion: Findings and Guidelines 10-11 (World Bank 
First Initiative, Final Report, 2008), available at http://www.cenfri.org/ 
documents/AML/AML_CFT%20and%20Financial%20Inclusion.pdf. 
47 FICA §§ 22-23. 
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 The person’s identity number.48 
Examples of documents that can be accepted as an alternative 
form of verification in exceptional circumstances are a valid South 
African driver’s license or passport as well as a valid temporary 
identity document issued by the Department of Home Affairs.49 
The latter documents should be valid in the sense that they must be 
current and unexpired. 
This exemption is, however, not applicable to individuals who 
are not South African citizens or residents, as no mention of such 
is made within the Regulations. If the Regulations are strictly 
implemented, migrants who have neither a passport nor valid travel 
document in their possession would be unable to access formal 
remittance services. It is submitted, however, that even if the 
exception were applicable to foreigners it would likely be of little 
effect taking into account that studies show that financial 
institutions such as banks have been hesitant to exercise the 
discretion bestowed upon them by Regulation 6.50 The 
conservative approach has been attributed to the significant fines 
that are associated with money laundering offences.51 
48 MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 4-5 (Reg. 4(a)(ii)). 
49 Fin. Intelligence Centre Guidance Note 3, Government Notice (GN) 
R715/2005 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/ 
DownloadFileAction?id=61267 [hereinafter FIC Guidance Note]; ABSA Bank, 
Establishing and Managing Business Relationships – Customer Identification 




50 For more detail on financial inclusion, see Louis de Koker & John 
Symington, Conservative Compliance Behaviour (FinMark Trust, 2011), 
available at http://www.cenfri.org/k2/item/95-conservative-compliance-
behaviour-2011. This study is the most recent study which also highlights trends 
in bank behaviour. See also CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR [CGAP] 
& THE WORLD BANK, FINANCIAL ACCESS 2010: THE STATE OF FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION THROUGH THE CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.cgap.org/ 
gm/document-1.9.46570/FA_2010_Financial_Access_2010_Rev.pdf; GPFI & 
INT’L FIN. CORP., FINANCIAL INCLUSION DATA: ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE AND 
COUNTRY-LEVEL TARGET APPROACHES (2011), available at 
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/WORKINGDATA.pdf. 
51 Bester et al., supra note 46, at 144.  
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Ideally the information gathered in identifying a client should 
enable a financial institution to form a client profile. According to 
de Koker, many South African institutions are unable to form an 
individual comprehensive client profile for general  financial 
service customers that would support effective AML/CFT 
monitoring for unusual activity.52 This is due to the fact that under 
ordinary circumstances financial institutions are only obliged to 
obtain information that pertains to the personal identity of the 
client. Such particulars only play a small role in building a client 
profile and are insufficient to enable a financial institution to 
effectively detect suspicious financial activity by a client. 
For a client profile to effectively be established, information 
such as the source of the client’s income would be needed. 
Financial institutions are only obliged to obtain such information 
in the case of business relationships or transactions that present a 
high risk of facilitating money-laundering activities.53 
In circumstances where a business relationship or once-off 
transaction presents a high risk of facilitating money laundering or 
where it is necessary for a financial institution to identify the 
proceeds of unlawful activity or money laundering, inter alia, the 
following must be ascertained: 
 The source of the client’s income; and 
 The source of the funds which the client intends to use to 
conclude the transaction or series of transactions in the 
course of a business relationship. 
Professor de Koker states that the procedure prescribed by the 
current Regulation 21 is essentially a “Know Your Customer” or 
CDD procedure, in contrast to the ordinary procedure of 
identifying clients which is merely a “Client Identification and 
Verification” procedure .54 
 
52 Louis de Koker, Client Identification and Money Laundering Control: 
Perspectives on the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, 4 J. OF S. AFR. 
L. 715, 723 (2004).  
53 MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 15 (Reg. 21).  
54 de Koker, supra note 52, at 724.  
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2. The Provision and Verification of a Residential Address 
 
The obligation to provide an address and the need for such to 
be verified appears to have been the chosen safeguard against 
identity fraud. The value of providing a residential address for 
purposes of identifying a customer has been questioned. It is 
argued that such a requirement may be more useful in developed 
countries without a system of national identity numbers, but with 
rich sources of data on their residents.55 In such countries, 
addresses are helpful to distinguish between different people with 
similar names, but are less functional in countries with 
comprehensive national identification systems. Once an 
accountable institution obtains a client’s name, date of birth, and 
unique national identity number, there is no need for it to obtain a 
residential address. Requiring address verification under these 
conditions does not add significant identification value, but causes 
undue hardship for customers who often lack formal addresses. 
Professor de Koker argues that the negative impact of 
residential address verification increases as a result of the high 
level of internal migration in South Africa.56 Such arguments 
become relevant when one considers the practical difficulties that 
have been experienced in South Africa in verifying the residential 
addresses of individuals. 
In South Africa, the verification of a client’s address has 
presented certain difficulties, particularly with low-income 
individuals.57 The drafters of the FICA and its Regulations were 
aware of the fact that individuals who lived in informal settlements 
and rural areas could face problems in verifying their residential 
address in accordance with the regulatory requisites.58 As a 
consequence, room for exception from the need to provide a 
residential address was created by means of “Exemption 17.” The  
 
55 Id. at 742.  
56 Id.  
57 Bester et al., supra note 43, at 18.  
58 Louis de Koker, The Money Laundering Risk Posed by Low-Risk 
Financial Products in South Africa: Findings and Guidelines, 12 J. MONEY 
LAUNDERING CONTROL 323, 325 (2009).  
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latter is contained within the Schedule to the MLTFC 
Regulations.59 
 
3. Enhancing Financial Inclusion: Exemption 17 and Mobile 
Money 
 
Exemption 17 relieves certain financial institutions from the 
general obligation placed upon them by Section 21 of the FICA, 
which requires them to attain as well as verify their customer’s 
residential address. The exemption is only applicable if certain 
requirements are fulfilled. Exemption 17 was included in the 
original set of Exemptions, but it proved of little value in practice 
as the requirements were too rigid and could not be met by many 
unbanked persons. Exemption 17 was therefore revised in 2004.60 
The amendments were informed by actual market research and 
take the needs of the financially excluded into account.61 
According to Isern and de Koker, this framework allows “financial 
institutions to verify a person’s identity using the national ID 
document without having to verify the person’s residential address 
if the financial product meets a certain balance limit (US$3,000) 
and transaction restrictions (US$600 per day).”62 
The amended Exemption 17 facilitated the launch of the 
Mzansi account63 that has reportedly brought over 6 million people 
into the formal financial sector.64 
59 Exemptions in Terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001, 
Exemption 17, Government Notice (GN) R1596/2002 9-10 (S. Afr.). 
60 Exemption in Terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001, 
Government Notice (GN) R1353/2004 (S. Afr.), available at 
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/RESOURCES/GUIDELINES/10.Rev
ised%20exemption.pdf [hereinafter FICA Exemption 17].  
61 de Koker, supra note 52, at 729; Hennie Bester et al., Legislative and 
Regulatory Obstacles to Mass Banking 65-66 (Genesis Analytics, 2003), 
available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30016861/dekoker-
legislativeandregulatory-2003.pdf.  
62 Jennifer Isern & Louis de Koker, AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial 
Inclusion and Integrity 10-11 (CGAP, Focus Note No. 56, 2009), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.37862/FN56.pdf. 
63 The Mzansi account is a savings account with basic transaction capability 
aimed at the low-income market. 
64 See the data in BANKABLE FRONTIER ASSOC., THE MZANSI BANK 
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The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) has, in addition, issued 
guidance notes as contemplated in Section 4(c) of the FICA, which 
provide guidance to banks in regard to which documents qualify as 
acceptable verification documentation. In establishing and 
verifying customer identity, banks are encouraged to undertake a 
“risk based approach” as opposed to following a “one size fits all 
approach.”65 
Exemption 17 also enabled the creation of a simplified CDD 
framework for mobile money. The Banks Act Guidance Note of 
2008 issued by the Registrar of Banks brought mobile banking 
products within the framework of Exemption 17. The product is 
offered to clients via a non-face-to-face process, which must be 
followed only on the basis of the minimum set of criteria being 
met. Importantly, however, a lower daily transaction limit of 
ZAR1,000 (US$120) per day is set.66 If a client wishes to exceed 
this limit, the normal verification procedures would have to be 
followed. Finally, the Guidance Note states that the “expansion of 
banking services should not happen to the detriment of control 
measures that are aimed at facilitating the detection and 
investigation, or even the prevention, of money laundering and 
terrorist financing through banks.”67 
It is submitted that the relief granted by Exemption 17, even in 
its amended form, is only partially effective in achieving the 
desired effect of increasing financial inclusion. This is taking into 
account that the exemption only provides room for exception in 
regard to the ascertainment of a client’s residential address; it does 
not absolve individuals from presenting an identity document. In 
addition to the latter, the exemption does not apply to cross-border 
ACCOUNT INITIATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.gatewaytosavings.org/cmsdocuments/MzansiProject-FINAL_ 
REPORT_March202009.pdf.  
65 FIC Guidance Note, supra note 49. For more detail on the risk-based 
approach, see also de Koker, supra note 58.  
66 Banks Act Guidance Note 6/2008 from E.M. Kruger, Office of the 
Registrar of Banks, to All Banks, Controlling Companies and Branches of 
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transactions that go beyond the Common Monetary Area (CMA), 
comprised of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.68 
Transactions that go beyond the CMA are still subject to the 
stringent CDD requisites imposed by FICA. Furthermore, the 
exemption only applies to certain accountable institutions and not 
all of them. Mobile money transfer businesses, unlike banking 
institutions, have not been included within the scope of the 
exemption. 
Asylum seekers have been dealt a major blow by the May 2010 
FIC advisory issued to banks that banks are not allowed to transact 
with asylum seekers based on the official certificates and permits 
issued by the South African government. This means that an 
asylum seeker is barred from opening a bank account and 
conducting transactions until the application for asylum is 
processed, asylum was granted and the refugee was issued with a 
more formal maroon South African refugee document. Before the 
issuing of the interpretation, they were allowed to rely on the 
permits and licenses to open accounts. Since the interpretation was 
issued, asylum seekers have reported that banks have also refused 
them permission to withdraw their funds from the accounts that 
they have previously opened, causing severe personal hardship.69 
Not only was the FIC advisory ineffective communication, it was 
also confrontational and upset a practice which banks have adopted 
as early as 2003. 
A compromise has since been reached following litigation 
challenging the position of the FIC allowing banks to accept 
asylum documentation to verify identify only after verifying the 
authenticity of the document with the South African Department of 
Home Affairs.70 
68 FICA Exemption 17, supra note 60, at 6. 
69 See FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/AML%20CFT% 
20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf. 
70 For more information on the debacle, see Tatenda Gumbo, S. African 
Court Restores Access to Bank Accounts by Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 
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Despite the compromise, the hardship for undocumented 
migrants deepened when they lost their access to mobile 
communication in South Africa. The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act (RICA)71 of 2002 introduced customer 
identification and verification measures that are very similar to the 
FICA CDD requirements. Users have to verify their identities 
using official documentation to access mobile communication 
services. Foreigners without passports are generally not able to 
legally gain normal access to South African-issued mobile phones. 
They are therefore faced with mobile money access barriers 
created by RICA as well as FICA.  A recent report stated: 
Refugees are vulnerable to the high levels of 
random crime that afflict South Africa, as well as 
sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation in 
the workplace and detention due to lack of proper 
documentation. Poor socio-economic conditions 
among host communities provide a breeding ground 
for xenophobia. Documents of limited validity 
compromise refugees’ efforts to become self-reliant 
by making it hard for them to hold long-term jobs, 
while at the same time a law allowing refugees and 
asylum-seekers to have bank accounts is not being 
fully implemented.72 
The fact that a passport must be presented effectively bars 
undocumented migrants who do not have valid travel documents 
from accessing formal remittance services. Migrants who live in 
informal settlements73 are also barred from accessing formal 
remittance channels as they are unable to fulfill the address 
71 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.internet.org.za/ricpci.html.  
72 See South Africa, THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/ 
pages/49e485aa6.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
73 HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, CITIZENSHIP, VIOLENCE AND 
XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: PERCEPTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMMUNITIES 16 (2008); Glenn Ashton, Xenophobia Redux, S. AFR. CIVIL 
SOCIETY INFO. SERV. (July 7, 2010), http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/510.1. 
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verification requisite imposed by FICA. In view of the above, it is 
submitted that regulators should give more thought in making 
policy that would align AML/CFT, financial inclusion, the 
regulation of telecommunications service providers who offer 
mobile money services, as well as South Africa’s international 
obligations to alleviate the plight of refugees. 
In his Article on the 2012 FATF Standards, de Koker notes that 
the risk-based approach is now mandatory for countries and 
institutions and that the cornerstone of the risk-based approach is 
risk assessment. It is interesting to note that South Africa has to 
some extent followed a risk-based approach, but to date no formal 
risk assessment has taken place. The current CDD requirements, 
for example, were based on the previous FATF Recommendations. 
Regulation 21, for example, was based on the predecessor of 2003 
Recommendation 5, which has now, in turn, been replaced by 
Recommendation 10. In effect this would mean that South Africa 
would have to conduct a formal risk assessment and in a sense 
conduct a “gap analysis” of the current CDD requirements as 
contained in the FICA and regulations thereto and match this 
against the new 2012 FATF Standards. Furthermore, lower-risk 
and higher-risk scenarios would have to be determined. Should the 
risk assessment show that mobile money is considered a “lower 
risk” product, the effect would be that the limits imposed would 
have to be commensurate with the risk identified, i.e. the lower the 
risk, the more simplified the measures should be. It would be 
interesting to see how this would be done in South Africa, where, 
as stated earlier, even though a “risk-based approach” was 
followed in the past, a formal risk assessment would now have to 
take place. It is hoped that in the formal risk assessment, a more 
equitable system would be employed as far as migrant workers 
who come from outside the CMA are concerned.74 This would 
74 For example, mobile money could be regarded as “financial products or 
services that provide appropriately defined and limited services to certain types 
of customers, so as to increase access for financial inclusion purposes.” FATF, 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 
64 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ 
recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved%20Februar
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mean that regulators would have to show more faith in refugees 
and asylum seekers in amending Exemption 17, which remains to 
be seen.75 
Even if the AML barriers are removed, refugees and asylum 
seekers are still faced with the barriers imposed by RICA.76 In 
effect this would mean that if a risk assessment is made for South 
Africa and a distinction is made between low-risk and high-risk 
scenarios, RICA would likewise have to be amended to allow for 
greater financial inclusion in line with the risk-based approach to 
be followed and formalised through the formal risk assessment. 
 
4. Cross-Border Networking 
 
If one is to take a look at the effects of AML measures upon 
the remittance industry from a wider perspective the FATF 
Standards become relevant. The 2012 FATF Standards deal with 
correspondent banking relationships in Regulation 13. Financial 
institutions that are involved in correspondent banking 
relationships must gather information about their counterparty’s 
business, which includes their AML and CFT supervision, 
investigation and regulatory action, and their AML/CFT controls. 
Furthermore, these financial institutions should obtain approvals 
from senior management before establishing new correspondent 
banking relationships; they must clearly understand the respective 
responsibilities of each institution and be satisfied that the 
respondent bank has conducted CDD on its customers who have 
direct access to accounts of the correspondent bank. 
New Recommendation 14 provides that countries should take 
measures to ensure that natural or legal persons who provide 
y%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf. For more 
detail, see Louis de Koker, The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations: 
Assessing and Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New 
Standards Framework, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 165, 175 (2013).  
75 For more detail see de Koker, supra note 58, at 328.  
76 See Louis de Koker, Will RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet 
Anti-Money Laundering Requirements and Facilitate the Development of 
Transformational Mobile Banking in South Africa? (FinMark Trust, Exploratory 
Note, 2010), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/Financial% 
20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion_final.pdf. 
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money or money value transfer services are licensed or registered 
and subject to effective systems for monitoring and compliance 
with the relevant measures called for in the FATF 
Recommendations. South Africa would need to ensure that this is 




Policy makers may need to consider some potentially new 
challenges posed by technological innovation and other changes in 
the payment system more generally as well as how these impact 
regulatory approaches with respect to AML/CFT. For instance, 
mobile money products in some countries may be offered by 
entities other than institutions subject to banking supervision, 
although many countries apply anti-money laundering laws to all 
institutions. 
The extent of CFT/AML regulation should depend on the 
relative attractiveness for money launderers and risk posed by such 
a scheme. In other words, if a risk-based approached is followed, 
the level of regulation would be relative to the risk introduced by 
such system. It is recommended that a stratified approach to 
regulation of m-money be followed, viewed from a risk-based 
AML/CFT perspective. 
The following factors could be taken into consideration to 
arrive at such a stratified approach based on the service rather than 
the institution: 
 Semi-open systems – A limited form of regulation could be 
applicable. Issuers could be licensed as M-Money Issuers 
similar to the EU or U.K. position or Authorized 
Institutions similar to the Hong Kong position. One of the 
conditions could be to place a limit on the value on the card 
similar to the U.K. position. 
 Open loop systems – In consultation with the SARB on 
oversight and supervisory issues, open loop systems would 
be regulated by the SARB in terms of its E-money Position 
Paper which restricts such systems to banks. However, 
from an AML/CFT perspective, the FIC could add 
provisions in the Regulations which would state that 
reporting on m-money products have to be done as part of 
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such bank’s obligations as an accountable institution in 
terms of FICA and the Regulations. 
The relief granted by Exemption 17, as mentioned previously, 
is only partially effective in facilitating greater financial inclusion. 
The view is taken bearing into account that Exemption 17 is not 
applicable to certain mobile money transfers, namely remittance 
transactions that go beyond the CMA,77 nor does it apply to 
financial institutions that provide mobile money transfers 
(remittance services) as their only business.78 Hence, migrant 
laborers who live in informal settlements face a significant barrier 
in accessing formal remittance services as they are likely to face 
significant difficulty in verifying their residential address. An 
amendment of Exemption 17 is thus needed if the trade-off has to 
be in favor of financial inclusion. It is always difficult to balance 
financial integrity on one hand and the concern of financial 
inclusion on the other. South Africa would have to conduct a 
formal risk assessment in accordance with the mandatory risk-
based approach advocated in the 2012 FATF Standards. This 
means that there is an opportunity to align the South African legal 
framework with the 2012 FATF Standards and hopefully, also 
amend Exemption 17 to be more inclusive, depending of course on 
the outcome of the formal risk assessment of course. This would 
also mean that the obstacles imposed by RICA be revisited in light 





This Article gives an overview of the legal and regulatory 
framework for mobile payments in South Africa. While the legal 
and regulatory framework is, for the most part, sound, the Article 
identifies risks, challenges, and uncertainties that regulators may 
take into account. The analysis also examines the significance of 
the South African Reserve Bank’s 2009 Position Paper on 
Electronic Money, the reasons for the change in regulatory stance, 
77 FICA Exemption 17, supra note 60, at 6.  
78 FICA Exemption 17, supra note 60.  
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and the effect that this may have on financial inclusion (access to 
the payment system) for non-bank mobile payment providers. 
Continued research in this area is needed to assess the impact of 
the change in regulatory stance on access to financial services for 
the poor, as a golden opportunity may be missed to increase 
financial inclusion to the payment system if it is found that there is 
over-regulation of mobile payments in South Africa. What may be 
needed is a stratified regulatory approach, that is, that regulation be 
structured by service rather than along traditional lines and that the 
focus should be on what type of regulation would be appropriate 
for which type of payment. The opportunity now arises to address 
this through a formal risk assessment, as mandated by the 2012 
FATF Standards, as well as an amendment to RICA to remove the 
obstacles for refugees and asylum seekers. If this is not done 
properly, the clear benefits of mobile money as shown in Kenya 
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